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CAUTION OR ACTIVISM?
MONETARY POLICY STRATEGIES
IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
MARTIN ELLISON AND LUCIO SARNO
University of Warwick
JOUKO VILMUNEN
Bank of Finland
We examine optimal policy in an open-economy model with uncertainty and learning,
where monetary policy actions affect the economy through the real exchange rate channel.
Our results show that the degree of caution or activism in optimal policy depends on
whether central banks are in coordinated or uncoordinated equilibrium. If central banks
coordinate their policy actions then activism is optimal. In contrast, if there is no
coordination, caution prevails. In the latter case caution is optimal because it helps central
banks to avoid exposing themselves to manipulative actions by other central
banks.
Keywords: Learning, Monetary Policy, Open Economy
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper contributes to a growing literature that takes the learning processes
of central banks seriously. Specifically, we examine optimal monetary policy
strategies for central banks that are learning in a two-country open-economy
environment. We emphasise the open-economy aspect by assuming that real ex-
change rate movements are an important part of the monetary transmission mech-
anism. Our analysis builds on previous studies of monetary policy and learning
in a closed economy, which typically conclude that an activist policy is optimal
since strong policy actions generate information that is useful for learning.1 In
our open-economy framework, the result does not necessarily hold and activist
policy may well be suboptimal. The generalization to the open-economy case is
therefore not a mere technical extension of existing models. Optimal monetary
policy strategy in an open economy can be very different to that in a closed
economy.
We thank James Bullard, Kaushik Mitra, Ulf So¨derstro¨m, Dan Thornton, David Vestin, Volker Wieland, and two
anonymous referees for very helpful comments and suggestions. Martin Ellison acknowledges support from an ESRC
Research Fellowship, “Improving Monetary Policy for Macroeconomic Stability in the 21st Century” (RES-000-27-
0126). Address correspondence to: Lucio Sarno, Professor of Finance, Warwick Business School, Coventry, CV4
7AL, United Kingdom; e-mail: lucio.sarno@wbs.ac.uk.
c© 2007 Cambridge University Press 1365-1005/07 $18.00 519
520 MARTIN ELLISON ET AL.
To derive our results we introduce uncertainty and learning into the textbook
two-country open-economy model of Walsh (2003). Uncertainty enters through
unobserved time-variation in the elasticities of aggregate supply and demand with
respect to the real exchange rate. Central banks are therefore unsure whether a real
exchange rate depreciation will primarily stimulate aggregate demand (through
improved competitiveness) or contract aggregate supply (through more expensive
imported materials). Learning arises naturally in such a framework, as central
banks continually process new data and update their estimates of the relevant
elasticities. We follow Walsh (2003) and draw a distinction between equilibria
with and without coordination between the central banks.
The key to understanding our results is to recognize that there are informational
spillovers in a two-country environment. A central bank contemplating an activist
policy must therefore take into account that information generated by its own
policy also will be used in the learning process of the other central bank. When
there is policy coordination, this is not a problem, as informational spillovers are
beneficial: it is better to coordinate policy between informed than uninformed
central banks. Optimal monetary policy strategy is activist and we replicate the
closed-economy result that policy actions should be strong to promote learning. In
the equilibrium without policy coordination the informational spillovers prove to
be more problematic. Absent coordination, each central bank independently tries
to manipulate the real exchange rate to its own advantage. In effect, the central
banks are in a conflict equilibrium of mutual attempted exploitation. The problem
with the informational spillover is that it ties together the way central banks learn
about how to exploit each other. Any benefit from one central bank learning how
to exploit the other then needs to be weighed against the cost of the other central
bank also learning how to exploit. The threat of increased exposure to exploitative
actions from the other central bank greatly attenuates the incentive to follow an
activist monetary policy strategy. In many cases, the cost of the other central bank
learning is sufficiently high that it completely dominates. The closed-economy
result is overturned and optimal monetary policy strategies are cautious rather
than activist, with weak policy responses designed to retard the learning of the
other central bank.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the textbook
two-country open-economy model and introduce a role for uncertainty and learn-
ing. Section 3 derives optimal monetary policy strategies with policy coordi-
nation. A similar analysis in Section 4 derives optimal monetary policy strate-
gies without policy coordination. Conclusions and further discussion are pre-
sented in Section 5. Appendices provides full details of the numerical methods
employed.
2. MODEL
Our model derives from the open-economy sticky-wage textbook model of Walsh
(2003). To it, we add uncertainty in the form of measurement errors and time
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variation in the elasticity parameters of aggregate supply and demand. The pres-
ence of uncertainty forces central banks to form and update beliefs about the
elasticities in the model. We assume Bayesian updating of beliefs, so central banks
are rational in their learning. They are, however, hampered by the measurement
errors that cloud the signals in observed variables. The final component of the
model is a definition of central bank objectives.
2.1. Structure of the Open Economy
The structure of the open economy is represented by AS-AD-UIP equations (1)–
(5), taken directly from Section 6.3.1 in Walsh (2003). Equations (1) and (2) are
open-economy aggregate supply curves, where outputs yt and y∗t in the home and
foreign countries are determined by the real exchange rate ρt (the relative price of
home and foreign output expressed in terms of the home currency), unexpected
inflation, and aggregate supply shocks et and e∗t . A real exchange rate depreciation
(ρt ↑) contracts supply because it increases the price of imported materials and
raises consumer prices relative to producer prices, which as a result of wage
rigidity increases the real wage in terms of producer prices. The aggregate supply
shocks are uncorrelated i.i.d. Gaussian distributed with mean zero and variance
σ 2e :
yt = −b1t ρt + b2(πt − Et−1πt) + et , (1)
y∗t = b1t ρt + b2(π∗t − Et−1π∗t ) + e∗t , (2)
yt = a1t ρt − a2rt + a3y∗t + ut , (3)
y∗t = −a1t ρt − a2r∗t + a3yt + u∗t , (4)
ρt = r∗t − rt + Etρt+1. (5)
Aggregate demand curves (3) and (4) link demand to the real exchange rate,
real interest rates rt and r∗t , foreign output, and aggregate demand shocks ut and
u∗t . A real exchange rate depreciation (ρt ↑) stimulates demand through improved
competitiveness as domestic goods become cheaper relative to foreign goods.
The presence of foreign output in the aggregate demand curves reflects the direct
spillover that arises when an increase in output in one country raises demand for
goods produced in the other. The aggregate demand shocks are uncorrelated i.i.d.
Gaussian with mean zero and variance σ 2u . Equation (5) is the uncovered interest
rate parity condition. Written as r∗t − rt = ρt − Etρt+1 it shows that any real
interest rate differential must be matched by an offsetting expected depreciation
or appreciation in the real exchange rate. Real interest rates in the model are
linked to nominal interest rates through the Fisher equations rt = it −Etπt+1 and
r∗t = i∗t − Etπ∗t+1. We assume that nominal interest rates are the instruments of
monetary policy.
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FIGURE 1. Timing protocol.
2.2. Uncertainty and Timing Protocol
To introduce uncertainty into the Walsh (2003) model, we allow some of the
elasticity parameters to be unobserved and time-varying, while making output and
inflation subject to measurement errors. Because our focus is on uncertainty and
learning in the open economy, we restrict unobservability and time variation to the
parameters b1t and a1t governing the elasticities of aggregate supply and demand
with respect to the real exchange rate. The other elasticity parameters (b2, a2, a3)
are assumed to be time-invariant and observable. For simplicity of the learning
process, the time-varying parameters are further restricted to follow a hidden
two-state Markov process. In other words, (b1t , a1t ) switches between (b1, a1)
and (b1, a1) and there is time variation in the absolute and relative magnitude
of real exchange rate effects on aggregate supply and demand.2 The conditional
probabilities ω of switching in the two-state Markov process are assumed to
be exogenous. Uncertainty about the elasticities is magnified by assuming that
observed realisations of output and inflation are subject to measurement error.
This ensures that central banks only have imperfect signals of output and inflation
from which to infer the current elasticities of aggregate supply and demand. The
measurement errors are assumed to have an i.i.d. Gaussian distribution with mean
zero.
The timing of the model is shown in Figure 1. At the beginning of the period,
private agents form time t − 1 dated expectations of inflation in period t. The
aggregate supply and demand shocks are then revealed to both central banks,
after which private agents form time t dated expectations of inflation and the real
exchange rate in period t + 1.3 The two central banks next set nominal interest
rates, the instrument of monetary policy. Activism or caution is reflected in the
degree to which nominal interest rates react to the observed shocks. Inflation,
output and the real exchange rate are observed (subject to measurement error) at
the end of the period. There is no asymmetric information in the model since each
central bank observes all shocks at the same time.
Our timing protocol retains the feature of the original textbook model that all
expectations terms are zero in equilibrium. As long as monetary policy strategies
do not inject systematic biases then the i.i.d. Gaussian nature of shocks is sufficient
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to guarantee Et−1πt = Et−1π∗t = 0 and Etπt+1 = Etπ∗t+1 = 0. With regard to the
real exchange rate, when shocks are i.i.d. Gaussian and expectations are rational
it is possible to write ρt = θEtρt+1 + vt , where 0 < θ < 1 and vt is white noise.
It follows that Etρt+1 = 0 in any no-bubbles solution.4
2.3. Equilibrium
A convenient representation of equilibrium can be obtained using the uncovered
interest rate parity condition to substitute out for the real exchange rate in the
aggregate supply and demand curves. Because all expectations terms are zero
in equilibrium, the result is a structural relationship linking observed output and
inflation to nominal interest rates, shocks, and measurement errors. Appendix A
derives the state-space form (6) of the structural relationship, where Yt , Rt , ξt and
ηt are vectors of observed outputs and inflations, nominal interest rates, shocks
and measurement errors respectively. The matrix At switches between A and A as
the elasticities in the aggregate supply and demand curves switch between (b1, a1)
and (b1, a1), whereas matrix B is time-invariant:
Yt = AtRt + Bξt + ηt . (6)
The definition of equilibrium is completed by adding monetary policy strategies
to the structural relationship (6) and the stochastic processes for At , ξt and ηt .
Monetary policy strategies specify nominal interest rate choices Rt by central
banks, typically as functions of beliefs, shocks and nominal interest rates set
by other central banks. We specify separate monetary policy strategies with and
without policy coordination in Sections 3 and 4.
2.4. Beliefs
Central banks cannot observe the time-varying elasticity parameters in At
directly—they can only form a belief about their current values. Because the elas-
ticities are restricted to switch according to a two-state Markov process, beliefs can
be represented parsimoniously by a single variable, µt = P(At = A); the belief
at time t that At is currently equal to A. If µt = 1 the home central bank is certain
that At = A. Conversely, if µt = 0 there is certainty that At = A. The beliefs of
the foreign central bank can similarly be summarized as µ∗t = P(At = A). The
symmetry of information in the model means that beliefs of both central banks
always coincide and µt = µ∗t for all t.
2.5. Learning
Beliefs are not static in the model but are updated whenever new information
becomes available. The central bank learning process updates beliefs according
to which set of elasticity parameters is more consistent with new observations
of output and inflation. Mathematically, the central bank has to infer whether
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At = A or At = A in the structural equilibrium relationship (6). The central bank
observes (Rt , ξt ) and is assumed to know all variances, so the question is which
of predicted distributions (7) and (8) is most likely to have generated observed
output and inflation Yt . The role of policy activism in learning is reflected in the
nominal interest rate choices Rt determining how easy it is for the central bank to
distinguish between observations from the two predicted distributions. If policy
is extremely cautious with Rt = (0 0)′ then the predicted distributions coincide
exactly and it is impossible for a central bank to learn:
Yt |At=A ∼ N [ARt + Bξt ;η], (7)
Yt |At=A ∼ N [ARt + Bξt ;η]. (8)
A simple application of Bayes rule describes the mechanics of the home central
bank updating its beliefs and learning. Equation (9) shows how initial beliefs µt
are updated to µ+t on the basis of new observations of output and inflation. Under
such Bayesian learning, µ+t depends on the relative probability of observing Yt
under the two sets of elasticity parameters:
µ+t =
µtP (Yt |At=A)
µtP (Yt |At=A) + (1 − µt)P (Yt |At=A)
. (9)
The updated belief µ+t represents optimal inference on the values of the elasticity
parameters at the end of period t. From this, the home central bank forms a
prediction µt+1 of which elasticities will apply in period t + 1, taking into account
that the elasticities may switch before then. In equation (10), the prediction is
calculated as a function of the probability of having A at time t (and not switching
from it) and the probability of having A at time t (but switching from it). The
switching probabilities ω11 and ω21 are assumed exogenous and known by the
central bank, so that
µt+1 = µ+t ω11 + (1 − µ+t )(1 − ω21). (10)
Equations (9) and (10), when combined with the predicted distributions (7) and
(8) for Yt , define a nonlinear learning process (11) for updating the beliefs of the
central bank:
µt+1 = B(µt , ξt , Rt , Yt ). (11)
According to equation (11), updated beliefs are a function of current beliefs,
shocks, nominal interest rates and observations of output and inflation. B(·) repre-
sents the Bayesian operator modified to take account of Markov-switching effects.
The symmetric nature of information means that beliefs of the foreign central bank,
µ∗t , are updated using exactly the same Bayesian formula. In the model, central
banks always learn together and beliefs are updated simultaneously and identically.
With such joint learning dµt = dµ∗t for all t.
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2.6. Central Bank Objectives
The final component of the model is a definition of central bank objectives. We
assume that central banks attempt to minimize a weighted average of output vari-
ability and inflation variability, following Svensson (1999) and Walsh (2003). Such
an objective ensures there are no systematic biases to policy and all expectations
terms are zero in i.i.d. equilibrium. Equations (12) and (13) show the algebraic
form of the central bank loss functions, with λ measuring the relative weight of
output variability and β being a discount factor between 0 and 1. The central banks
have identical preferences:
Vt =
∞∑
i=0
βi
(
λy2t+i + π2t+i
) (12)
V ∗t =
∞∑
i=0
βi[λ(y∗t+i )2 + (π∗t+i )2]. (13)
Central bank loss functions (12) and (13) are used to derive optimal mon-
etary policy strategies with and without policy coordination in Sections 3
and 4.
3. POLICY WITH COORDINATION
Our analysis of coordinated monetary policy strategies is based on deriving optimal
policy under two alternative assumptions about how central banks take learning
into account. With the passive learning policy, the central banks learn but make
no conscious effort to influence the speed of learning. This forms our reference
case because, although both central banks learn, neither takes into account that the
degree of activism or caution in policy affects learning. In contrast, with an active
learning policy the central banks do internalise the consequences of activism or
caution for learning. The difference between monetary policy strategies under
passive and active learning measures the degree of activism or caution induced by
active learning.
3.1. Passive Learning
With the passive learning policy, central banks optimally account for current
uncertainty but fail to realize that policy actions affect future uncertainty through
the learning process. Learning is not internalized. Because learning is the only
source of dynamics in the model, the coordinated policy problem reduces to that
of minimising the sum of the one-period central bank loss functions each period,
subject to equilibrium structural relationship (6), shocks ξt = (et ut e∗t u∗t )′ and
beliefs µt . The loss minimization problem with policy coordination is defined in
(14):
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min
Rt
Et (Y
′
t Yt )
s.t.
Yt = ARt + Bξt + ηt with probability µt (14)
Yt = ARt + Bξt + ηt with probability 1 − µt
µt , ξt given.
In the objective, Yt is a vector of observations of (yt πt y∗t π∗t )′ subject to
measurement errors ηt .  is a 4 × 4 matrix of preference weights with (λ 1 λ 1)
on the leading diagonal and zeros elsewhere, giving equal weight to each central
bank in coordinated equilibrium. The choice variable Rt = (it i∗t )′ is a vector of
nominal interest rates, the instrument of monetary policy. The loss minimization
problem (14) is a simple modification of the linear-quadratic control problems
studied by, for example, Sargent (1987). Standard techniques give the solution in
terms of an optimal coordinated monetary policy strategy (15):
Rt = −[µtA′A + (1 − µt)A′A]−1[µtA′B + (1 − µt)A′B]ξt . (15)
As expected in a linear-quadratic framework, optimized monetary policy strat-
egy has nominal interest rates reacting linearly to the shocks. The extent of the
reaction depends on beliefs µt , structural parameters A,A,B and preferences
. In general, passive learning policies tend to be cautious in order to avoid the
increase in uncertainty that strong policy actions create. This call for caution under
parameter uncertainty, most closely associated with Brainard (1967), resurfaces
in our model as the reaction coefficient in (15) is less than its certainty equivalent
value.5
3.2. Active Learning
The passive learning policy is not fully optimal because it does not internalize
the costs and benefits of learning. This forms the basis for the closed-economy
argument that monetary policy strategy should be more activist. Activism is ben-
eficial because strong policy reactions create valuable information about the state
of the economy and help the central banks to learn. To assess this argument in
an open-economy coordinated policy context, we calculate the active learning
policy followed by central banks when they take all learning costs and benefits
into account. By definition, the coordinated active learning policy solves dynamic
loss-minimization problem (16), where the expected net present value of losses
is minimized subject to the equilibrium structural relationship, shocks, beliefs,
and the learning process (11) by which central banks update their beliefs. The
minimization problem is intertemporal because future beliefs depend on current
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actions:
min
{Rt }
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(Y ′t+iYt+i )
s.t.
Yt+i = ARt+i + Bξt+i + ηt+i with probability µt+i
(16)
Yt+i = ARt+i + Bξt+i + ηt+i with probability 1 − µt+i
µt+i+1 = B(µt+i , ξt+i , Rt+i , Yt+i )
µt , ξt given.
The problem has a recursive nature so coordinated active learning policy must
satisfy the Bellman equation (17):
V (µt , ξt ) = min
Rt
Et [Y ′t Yt + βV (µt+1, ξt+1)]. (17)
It is not possible to derive a closed-form solution to this problem because of
the nonlinearity in the learning process for updating beliefs. The presence of
the nonlinear learning constraint also complicates any proof of existence and
uniqueness of equilibrium. However, Wieland (2000a) applies results from Kiefer
and Nyarko (1989) to show that a unique equilibrium policy does exist, so standard
dynamic programming algorithms can be used to obtain a numerical solution to
the Bellman equation and active learning policy.6
3.3. Numerical Example
Our baseline numerical example is designed to best highlight the incentives for
activism and caution in monetary policy strategies for the open economy. To this
end, we choose parameter values that emphasize the real exchange rate channel
and its time variation. Table 1 shows our baseline parameterization. In words,
the parameterization implies that the real exchange rate channel of monetary
policy transmission switches between acting through aggregate supply and acting
through aggregate demand. When elasticities (b1t , a1t ) take the values (1, 0) a
real exchange rate depreciation contracts aggregate supply but leaves aggregate
demand unchanged. With the values (0, 1) the opposite is true and real exchange
rate depreciations stimulate aggregate demand while having no supply-side ef-
fects. The Markov-switching process determining time variation in the elasticities
TABLE 1. Baseline parameter values
(b1, a1) (b1, a1) ω11 ω21 a2 a3 b2 σ
2
e σ
2
u σ
2
η λ β
(1, 0) (0, 1) 0.95 0.05 0.1 0 1 1 0 1.5 5 0.99
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is assumed to be symmetric with a 5% probability of switching each period.
Elasticities that do not switch are less central to our analysis. We set a2 to a small
number so the direct effect of nominal interest rates on aggregate demand is weak
and central banks are forced to exploit the real exchange rate channel to stabilize
their economies. a3 is set to zero to shut down the direct spillover of output in one
country to aggregate demand in the other, as this spillover is not part of the real
exchange rate channel. The elasticity of aggregate supply with respect to surprise
inflation b2 is normalized to unity to give a 45o Phillips curve slope.
The parameters of the stochastic processes for shocks and measurement errors
are chosen to maintain the essence of the model while reducing computational
complexity. To keep the dimension of the state space manageable we normalize
σ 2e to unity and follow Walsh (2003) by setting σ 2u to zero, implying that only
aggregate supply is subject to shocks.7 For similar reasons, we introduce suffi-
ciently large measurement errors in observed inflation that it becomes completely
uninformative for learning. This simplifies the learning process but does not change
the incentives for activism or caution in monetary policy strategy. The value for
σ 2η in Table 1 is the variance of measurement errors in observed output. The final
parameters concern the preferences of the central bank. We set λ large because
otherwise there would be too much incentive for policy to react to what are
effectively inflation shocks in our model. The discount factor β is close to one as
usual.
Having parameterized our numerical example, we are able to solve for optimal
monetary policy strategies that map shocks and beliefs to nominal interest rates
under passive and active learning. In our case, the monetary policy strategies are
a complex multidimensional mapping from R3 (two shocks and one belief) to R2
(two nominal interest rates). Our discussion therefore focuses on a representative
part of the mapping, asking how nominal interest rates react to the combination
of a positive aggregate supply shock in the home country and a negative aggre-
gate supply shock in the foreign country. In the absence of any policy reaction,
the shocks would cause inflation to fall below target in the home country and
rise above target in the foreign country. The optimal policy response to such a
situation depends on whether the real exchange rate is currently believed to act
through the aggregate supply or the aggregate demand side of the economy. If
the supply-side effect dominates, there is a strong incentive for the home country
to reduce its nominal interest rate and the foreign country to raise its nominal
interest rate. The resulting real exchange rate depreciation (as determined by the
uncovered interest rate parity condition) affects aggregate supply and so suitably
offsets the aggregate supply shocks in both countries. If the demand-side effect
dominates, then the incentives for central banks to react are much weaker. En-
gineering a real exchange rate depreciation is now less desirable because it acts
on aggregate demand, which can only imperfectly offset the aggregate supply
shocks.
Figure 2 presents numerically solved optimal monetary policy strategies in
the baseline parameterization of the model. The first panel shows the reaction of
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FIGURE 2. Policy function and unconditional value functions with policy coordination.
nominal interest rates to a unit positive aggregate supply shock in the home country
and unit negative aggregate supply shock in the foreign country. As expected,
under both passive and active learning the home central bank reduces its nominal
interest rate it and the foreign central bank raises its nominal interest rate i∗t .
Again as expected, the reactions of nominal interest rates are stronger if the central
banks believe that the real exchange rate acts more through aggregate supply than
aggregate demand.8 The second panel confirms that changes in nominal interest
rates lead to a depreciation (ρt ↑) in the real exchange rate through the uncovered
interest rate parity condition.
Comparing monetary policy strategies under the different learning assumptions,
it is apparent that the active learning policy involves slightly stronger policy re-
actions than the passive learning policy.9 In Figure 2, nominal interest rates react
more under the active learning policy and there is a larger depreciation in the real
exchange rate. We therefore conclude that optimal monetary policy strategies are
activist when policy is coordinated by central banks in open-economy equilib-
rium. Our conclusion mirrors the results from the closed-economy literature. The
rationale is also similar, in that activism is beneficial because it produces useful
information that promotes the learning of central banks. Learning is beneficial
because it puts central banks in a better position to respond to shocks in the future.
Although the policies look only slightly different in Figure 2, the benefits to
pursuing an active learning policy are significant. Small differences in policy
quickly cumulate into substantial differences in the dynamic behavior of the
economy. The small differences here are already sufficient to raise the correlation
between beliefs and the true values of the time-varying elasticities from 0.237 to
0.260, representing a 10% improvement in the ability of central banks to track
the true structure of the economy. To quantify the benefit of faster learning, the
third panel of Figure 2 plots the unconditional value functions as defined by their
expected values at the beginning of the period before shocks are observed.10 The
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difference in the unconditional value functions implies that the active learning
policy reduces losses by approximately 0.12%.
3.4. Sensitivity Analysis
To establish the robustness of our results, we show they are valid for a wide range
of alternative parameterizations of the model. It is computationally demanding
to calculate the active learning policy for each parameterization, so we take a
short cut and identify only the incentives for activism in optimal monetary policy
strategy, accepting our results if we can show there are incentives to increase
policy activism over and above the level found in the passive learning policy. The
advantage of this approach is that incentives can be identified without iterating the
Bellman equation of the active learning policy. The incentives themselves depend
on whether the unconditional value function is convex or concave under passive
learning. If the unconditional value function is concave then central banks strictly
prefer an activist policy that reduces uncertainty.11 In Figure 2, the unconditional
value function is clearly concave under passive learning, which confirms that
optimal policy is activist in the baseline parameterization. Furthermore, the first
row of Table 2 shows that the expected return function Le(µt ) = Et−1(Y ′t Yt )
is also concave under passive learning, a sufficient condition for concavity of the
unconditional value function itself.
In the remaining rows of Table 2, we allow parameters {(b1, a1), (b1, a1), a2}
to change whilst keeping other model parameters at their baseline values. The fact
that the expected return function is always concave implies that the unconditional
value function remains concave and optimal monetary policy strategy is activist
in each case. We take this as strong support for the robustness of our result. The
incentives for policy activism survive a relative strengthening or weakening of the
real exchange rate channel as represented by changes in a2 in the second and third
rows. Similarly, changing the relative magnitude of aggregate supply and demand
elasticities in the fourth and fifth rows does not destroy the incentives for activism.
TABLE 2. Concavity of the expected return function at
µt = 0.5 with policy coordination
(b1, a1) (b1, a1) a2
d2Le(µt )
dµ2
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.1 −1.155
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.05 −1.163
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.2 −1.127
{0, 0.25} {1, 0} 0.1 −0.191
{0, 1} {0.25, 0} 0.1 −0.186
{0, 0.5} {1, 0.5} 0.1 −0.037
{0.5, 1} {0.5, 0} 0.1 −0.429
CAUTION OR ACTIVISM? 531
Finally, it is possible to remove time-variation in either elasticity in the sixth and
seventh rows without overturning our result.
4. POLICY WITHOUT COORDINATION
It is well known that policy recommendations are often sensitive to the assumption
of whether policies are coordinated or uncoordinated.12 This is particularly true
in our open-economy framework. When there is no coordination, each central
bank has to set its monetary policy strategy in part as a best response to the
monetary policy strategy of the other central bank. The resulting noncooperative
Nash equilibrium is typically characterized by “beggar thy neighbor” policies as
both central banks try to manipulate the real exchange rate to their own—rather
than mutual—advantage. To disentangle the incentives for activist policy we again
derive optimal monetary policy strategies under passive and active learning. For
comparability with coordinated policy results, we use the same parameter values
in our baseline numerical example and sensitivity analysis.
4.1. Passive Learning
The loss minimization problem faced by the home passive-learning central bank
is shown in (18). As in the coordinated policy case, learning is the only source of
dynamics and the problem reduces to minimizing the one-period central bank loss
function each period. However, compared to coordination there are two important
differences. First, in the objective 1 is a 4 × 4 matrix of zeros with (λ 1 0 0) on
the leading diagonal because the home central bank only cares about output and
inflation in its own country. Second, optimization is conditional on the monetary
policy strategy of the foreign central bank, so the foreign nominal interest rate i∗t
is taken as given:
min
it
Et (Y
′
t 1Yt )
s.t.
Yt = A1it + A2i∗t + Bξt + ηt with probability µt (18)
Yt = A1it + A2i∗t + Bξt + ηt with probability1 − µt
µt , ξt , i
∗
t given.
The constraint in the optimization problem is the same equilibrium structural
relationship (6) as before, since it holds irrespective of whether monetary policy
strategies are coordinated or uncoordinated. To distinguish between it as a choice
variable and i∗t as given, we decomposeAt in the equilibrium structural relationship
into matrices A1t and A2t for it and i∗t , respectively; Appendix A gives full
details. The optimization problem again falls in the class of linear-quadratic control
problems studied by Sargent (1987), so standard solution techniques produce an
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optimal uncoordinated monetary policy strategy (19) for the home central bank:
it = −(µtA′11A1 + (1 − µt)A′11A1)−1
×
[
(µtA
′
11A2 + (1 − µt)A′11A2)i∗t
+ (µtA′11B + (1 − µt)A′11B)ξt
]
. (19)
Optimal monetary policy strategy has the home nominal interest rate reacting
linearly to shocks and the foreign nominal interest rate. The element of caution in
coordinated policy is repeated here as uncertainty again dampens the reaction of
the home nominal interest rate to shocks.13 An analogous monetary policy strategy
(20) is followed by the foreign central bank, making the foreign nominal interest
rate a function of shocks and the home nominal interest rate:
i∗t = − (µ∗t A′22A2 + (1 −µ∗t )A′22A2)−1
×
[
(µ∗t A
′
22A1 + (1 −µ∗t )A′22A1)it
+ (µ∗t A′22B + (1 −µ∗t )A′22B)ξt
]
. (20)
The equilibrium under passive learning with no policy coordination can now
be fully specified as the structural relationship (6), monetary policy strategies
(19)–(20), and the stochastic processes for At , ξt and ηt .
4.2. Active Learning
When central banks follow active learning policies, they internalize learning in
their monetary policy strategies. To analyze such policies when there is no policy
coordination, we need to refine our concept of equilibrium. A natural candidate is to
restrict our attention to Markov-perfect equilibria in which each central bank takes
the current and future strategies of the other central bank as given. In practice, this
translates into the home central bank taking the current foreign nominal interest
rate as given but recognizing that future foreign nominal interest rates depend on
future beliefs. The loss minimization problem of the home active-learning central
bank is presented in (21):
min
{it }
Et
∞∑
i=0
βi(Y ′t+i1Yt+i )
s.t.
Yt+i = A1it+i + A2i∗t+i + Bξt+i + ηt+i with probability µt+i
Yt+i = A1it+i + A2i∗t+i + Bξt+i + ηt+i with probability 1− µt+i
µt+i+1 = B(µt+i , ξt+i , it+i , i∗t+i , Yt+i ) (21)
µ∗t+i = µt+i
i∗t+i = i∗t+i (µ∗t+i , it+i , ξt+i )
µt , ξt , i
∗
t given.
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The first two constraints are a simple restatement of the equilibrium structural
relationship (6), as explained in the case of passive learning with coordination.
The third constraint is the learning process by which the home central bank
updates its beliefs, whereas the fourth constraint acknowledges that all learning
is joint with the foreign central bank. The fifth constraint is the monetary policy
strategy used by the foreign central bank to set nominal interest rates in the future.
The nonlinearities inherent in central bank learning preclude any closed-form
solution to the optimization problem and we again resort to numerical techniques
to characterise equilibrium. In Markov-perfect equilibrium the monetary policy
strategy of one central bank depends on the monetary policy strategy of the other,
so we need to iterate twin Bellman equations (21)–(22) to obtain a numerical
solution. We do this sequentially until convergence of active learning policies in
both central banks:14
V (µt , i
∗
t , ξt ) = min
it
Et [Y ′t 1Yt + βV (µt+1, i∗t+1, ξt+1)], (22)
V ∗(µ∗t , it , ξt ) = min
i∗t
Et [Y ′t 2Yt + βV ∗(µ∗t+1, it+1, ξt+1)]. (23)
The equilibrium under active learning with no policy coordination is completely
specified by the structural relationship (6), monetary policy strategies that solve
Bellman equations (22)–(23), and the stochastic processes for At , ξt and ηt .
4.3. Numerical Example
The baseline numerical example of Section 3.3 is a natural reference point for
analysing uncoordinated policies. We therefore retain the baseline parameter val-
ues in Table 1. To recap, the key feature of the baseline parameterization is the real
exchange rate switching between having supply-side and demand-side effects.
We also adopt the same focus as before by looking at the reaction of nominal
interest rates to a unit positive aggregate supply shock in the home country and a
unit negative aggregate supply shock in the foreign country. Figure 3 presents our
numerical results.
The passive learning policy in the first panel of Figure 3 is very similar to that
in Figure 2 for coordinated policies.15 The home central bank reacts to a positive
shock by cutting its nominal interest rate, whilst the foreign central bank raises
its nominal interest rate after a negative shock. The second panel of Figure 3
shows the resulting depreciation of the real exchange rate. As expected from the
results with coordination, reactions are stronger when central banks believe the
real exchange rate mostly affects the supply-side of the economy. The difference
between monetary policy strategies under passive and active learning is, though,
particularly striking in Figure 3. Whereas optimal coordinated monetary policy
strategy was activist, we now find that optimal strategy is cautious. This is wit-
nessed by weak reactions of nominal interest rates and a smaller depreciation of
the real exchange rate under active learning.
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FIGURE 3. Policy function and unconditional value functions without policy coordination.
The finding that cautious monetary policy strategies can be optimal runs counter
to established wisdom that policy should be activist to generate information useful
for learning. If anything, it appears that optimal uncoordinated monetary policy
strategies are designed to avoid generating information and learning is better
retarded than promoted. This is indeed the case as the correlation between beliefs
and the true values of the time-varying elasticities falls from 0.236 under passive
learning to 0.216 under active learning, a deterioration of 8% in the ability of
central banks to track the structure of the economy. The reason why such a
seemingly counterintuitive policy is optimal lies in the fact that central banks
do not learn in isolation in the open economy, so any attempt at activist policy
promotes the learning of both central banks. This is problematic when policies
are not coordinated: an activist policy is desirable in that it helps a central bank
to learn but undesirable in that it also helps the other central bank to learn. In our
numerical example, the cost of allowing the other central bank to learn dominates
so optimal monetary policy strategy is cautious. On balance, a central bank prefers
not to learn how to manipulate the real exchange rate because in doing so the other
central bank also learns and starts to manipulate the real exchange rate.16 Optimal
monetary policy strategies internalise these incentives and recommend caution as a
way of simultaneously slowing the learning of both central banks. The third panel
of Figure 3 confirms that caution is a welfare-improving policy, with the difference
in unconditional value functions representing a reduction in losses under active
learning of the order of 0.25%.
4.4. Sensitivity Analysis
To check the robustness of our uncoordinated policy result, we subject it to the
same sensitivity analysis as we did the coordinated policy result. We continue to
take the short cut of identifying the incentives for increasing policy activism, as
this proves particularly informative when policies are uncoordinated. To proceed,
we substitute passive learning policies (19)–(20) and the equilibrium structural
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TABLE 3. Concavity of the expected return function at µt = 0.5 without policy
coordination
a1 b1 a2 Lµµ Lµ∗µ∗ Lµµ∗ d
2Le(µt ,µ∗t )
dµ2
∣∣∣
dµ=dµ∗
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.1 −0.159 0.403 0.154 0.551
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.05 −0.079 0.498 0.211 0.841
{0, 1} {1, 0} 0.2 −0.248 0.273 0.081 0.187
{0, 0.25} {1, 0} 0.1 −0.123 0.105 0.932 1.846
{0, 1} {0.25, 0} 0.1 −0.239 0.149 0.054 0.018
{0, 0.5} {1, 0.5} 0.1 −0.044 −0.036 0.100 0.120
{0.5, 1} {0.5, 0} 0.1 −0.203 0.221 0.083 0.184
relationship (6) into the one period return in (12) to obtain the expected return
of the home central bank Le(µt , µ∗t ) as a function of the beliefs of the home and
foreign central banks. Writing the expected return function in terms of beliefs is
useful because it admits a decomposition of incentives for activism according to
which central bank is learning. The decomposition is based on the total second
differential (24) of the expected return function of the home central bank (time
subscripts on beliefs have been dropped for ease of notation):
d2Le(µt , µ∗t ) = Lµµdµ2 + Lµ∗µ∗dµ∗2 + 2Lµµ∗dµdµ∗. (24)
The symmetric nature of the model means that the home and foreign central
banks always learn together. We therefore evaluate the convexity or concavity of
the expected return function along the locus of points where µt =µ∗t . Equation (25)
shows that the second derivative can then be decomposed into three components.
The first two terms capture convexity or concavity with respect to the separate
beliefs of the home and foreign central banks, whilst the third term explicitly
accounts for central banks learning together:
d2Le(µt , µ∗t )
dµ2
∣∣∣∣
dµ=dµ∗
= Lµµ + Lµ∗µ∗ + 2Lµµ∗ . (25)
The first row of Table 3 shows the decomposed second derivative in our baseline
numerical example. The fact that Lµµ is negative implies that the expected return
function is concave with respect to the beliefs of the home central bank. In this
respect there is an incentive to increase the level of policy activism. However,
Lµ∗µ∗ and Lµµ∗ are both positive so overall the expected return function is convex
and the incentives for policy activism are overturned once we factor in the learning
of the foreign central bank. The decomposition confirms our explanation in Section
4.3 for why optimal uncoordinated monetary policy strategies are cautious. An
activist policy is desirable in that it helps the home central bank to learn (Lµµ < 0)
but undesirable in that it also helps the foreign central bank to learn (Lµ∗µ∗ > 0).
Learning together is particularly problematic (Lµµ∗ > 0).
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The remaining rows of Table 3 decompose the incentives for policy activism
in alternative parameterizations of the model. In all cases, there is an incentive to
increase policy activism if the home central bank considers its own learning in
isolation, but once the learning of the foreign central bank is taken into account the
optimal monetary policy strategy becomes cautious. We interpret this as evidence
for the robustness of our result.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main contribution of this paper is to show that there is ambiguity in the degree
of caution or activism in optimal monetary policy strategies for an open economy,
a result in sharp contrast to the closed-economy literature which unambiguously
recommends activist policy. The ambiguity arises because there is more than
one central bank in the open economy and monetary policy strategies may or
may not be coordinated. If policies are coordinated then we recover the closed-
economy result that strategies should be activist to speed up learning: it is better to
coordinate policy between informed than uninformed central banks. If policies are
uncoordinated then the converse is true and strategies should be cautious to slow
down learning: a central bank prefers to be in noncooperative equilibrium with
uninformed than informed central banks. This result is derived in a context that
stresses the real exchange rate channel of the monetary transmission mechanism,
so in situations in which the open-economy aspect is less prominent we would
expect activist policy strategies to dominate in line with the closed-economy
literature. However, this result is still valid in that incentives for activist policy
will be enhanced or attenuated in the open economy according to whether policies
are coordinated or uncoordinated.
Our results also shed new light on the debate about the gains from international
policy coordination. One of the seminal contributions in this literature is
Ghosh and Masson (1991), who argue that learning can restore the benefits to
international policy coordination that earlier work by Frankel and Rockett (1988)
argued were lost if there is model uncertainty. The learning they consider is purely
passive so our contribution takes the argument a step further and asks how active
learning affects the gains to international policy coordination. The results suggest
two effects working in opposite directions. First, active learning increases the gains
to coordination by improving the “good” outcome when policies are coordinated.
Active learning prompts coordinated central banks to follow activist strategies,
making them learn faster and putting them in a better position to stabilise
their economies. Second, active learning reduces the gains to coordination by
improving the “bad” outcome when policies are not coordinated. Active learning
in the absence of coordination gives central banks an incentive to follow cautious
strategies, thereby slowing learning and avoiding conflict. The overall effect on the
gains to international policy coordination is likely to be ambiguous as the “good”
coordinated outcome gets better and the “bad” uncoordinated outcome gets less
bad.17
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NOTES
1. See Basar and Salmon (1990), Bertocchi and Spagat (1993), Balvers and Cosimano (1994) and
Wieland (2000b). Central bankers such as Blinder (1998) disagree and argue that policy should be
predominantly cautious, but generally they do not provide formal theoretical arguments to support this
view.
2. Restricting b1t and a1t to switch simultaneously is done for computational reasons and is
not critical for our results. Similarly, retaining the symmetry of the Walsh (2003) model by having
simultaneous/identical shifts in both countries is not a prerequisite for our results. All we require is
some unobserved time variation in the real exchange rate channel of the monetary policy transmission
mechanism.
3. The precise point at which private agents form expectations of future variables is unimportant.
The combination of no systematic policy biases and i.i.d. shocks means expectations of future variables
will be zero throughout the period anyway.
4. For more details on these arguments, see Section 6.3.1 of Walsh (2003).
5. To see this note that µtA′A + (1 − µt )A′A > (µtA + (1 − µt )A)′(µtA + (1 − µt )A) as
long as µt (1 − µt )A′A (the covariance term in the Brainard conservatism result) is small.
6. Blackwell’s sufficiency conditions are satisfied for this class of problems [see Kiefer and Nyarko
(1989)], so it is possible to define a contraction mapping that converges to a unique fixed point. Repeated
iterations over the Bellman equation will therefore converge to the stationary optimal policy and value
function. More details about this solution technique are given in Appendix B.
7. The precise mix of aggregate supply and demand shocks is unimportant for our recommendations
vis-a`-vis activism or caution in monetary policy strategy. All we require are some shocks that perturb
the system and motivate central banks to stabilize their economies by manipulating the real exchange
rate. Aggregate supply shocks provide this motivation so we can abstract from aggregate demand
shocks.
8. Reactions are stronger when µt is close to zero as the supply-side effect is believed to dominate.
Note also that the reaction of nominal interest rates is muted when there is uncertainty. This reflects
the Brainard (1967) result discussed in Section 3.1.
9. That interest rates react only slightly more under active learning confirms the small gains to
experimentation typically found in this type of model, see Cogley and Sargent (2006).
10. The unconditional value function under passive learning is calculated by iterating on the
equation V (µt , ξt ) = Et [Y ′t Yt +βV (µt+1, ξt+1)], while imposing learning process (11) and passive
learning policy (15). The corresponding unconditional value function under active learning is taken
directly from the Bellman equation (17).
11. See DeGroot (1962) and Ellison and Vilmunen (2005) for more details of this approach to
calculating the incentives for policy experimentation under learning.
12. For example, Walsh (2003) shows that policy reacts less to aggregate supply shocks in his
textbook model if there is no coordination.
13. We have µtA′11A1 + (1 −µt )A′11A1 > (µtA1 + (1 −µt )A1)′1(µtA1 + (1 −µt )A1) as
the equivalent condition to that for coordinated policy in footnote 5. The Brainard (1967) result holds
as long as µt (1 − µt )A′11A1 is not too large.
14. An issue arises in that existence and uniqueness of the Markov-perfect equilibrium is no longer
guaranteed once we move away from the linear monetary policy strategies of passive learning. Our
response is to appeal to a continuity argument that a unique equilibrium still exists as long as the
incentives to change policy as learning is internalized are sufficiently small. Given that the difference
between passive and active learning appears marginal in our numerical solution, it seems likely that
this will be the case in our parameterizations of the model.
15. The similarity is partly an illusion. It is caused by focussing on the response of nominal interest
rate to shocks of opposite sign in each country. Such shocks create very little conflict, as both central
banks want to depreciate the real exchange rate. In contrast, if shocks have the same sign there are
conflicting aims for the real exchange rate and significant differences arise in policies with and without
coordination. The illusion of similarity disappears once we examine the full strategy space.
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16. In comparison, the problem does not arise when policies are coordinated because there is no
incentive for central banks to manipulate the real exchange rate to mutually exploit each other.
17. In our baseline numerical example, the improvement in the unconditional value function with
coordination (the third panel of Figure 2) is slightly less than the improvement without coordination
(the third panel of Figure 3), so active learning marginally reduces the gains to policy coordination.
We report this result for illustration purposes and make no claim about its robustness.
18. The state space expands to (µt , i∗t , ξt ) when policies are uncoordinated.
REFERENCES
Balvers, Ronald J. and Thomas F. Cosimano (1994) Inflation variability and gradualist monetary policy.
Review of Economic Studies 61, 721–738.
Basar, Tamer and Mark Salmon (1990) Credibility and the value of information transmission in
a model of monetary policy and inflation. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 14,
97–116.
Bertocchi, Graziella and Michael Spagat (1993) Learning, experimentation and monetary policy.
Journal of Monetary Economics 23, 169–183.
Blinder, Alan S. (1998) Central Banking in Theory and Practice. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Brainard, William (1967) Uncertainty and the effectiveness of policy. American Economic Review
Papers and Proceedings 57, 411–425.
Cogley, Timothy and Thomas J. Sargent (2006) Anticipated Utility and Rational Expectations as
Approximations of Bayesian Decision Making. Mimeo, University of California, Davis and New
York University.
DeGroot, Morris H. (1962) Uncertainty, information, and sequential experiments. Annals of Mathe-
matical Statistics 44, 404–419.
Ellison, Martin and Jouko Vilmunen (2005) A simple approach to identifying the incentives for policy
experimentation. Economics Letters 86, 167–172.
Frankel, Jeffrey A. and Katharine E. Rockett (1988) International macroeconomic policy coordination
when policymakers do not agree on the true model. American Economic Review 78, 318–340.
Ghosh, Atish R. and Paul R. Masson (1991) Model uncertainty, learning, and the gains from coordi-
nation. American Economic Review 81, 465–479.
Kiefer, Nicholas M. and Yaw Nyarko (1989) Optimal control of an unknown linear process with
learning. International Economic Review 30, 571–586.
Sargent, Thomas J. (1987) Dynamic Macroeconomic Theory. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Svensson, Lars E.O. (1999) Price level targeting versus inflation targeting: A free lunch? Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 31, 277–295.
Walsh, Carl E. (2003) Monetary Theory and Policy, 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wieland, Volker (2000a) Learning by doing and the value of optimal experimentation—Optimal
learning with endogenous information. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 24, 501–534.
Wieland, Volker (2000b) Monetary policy, parameter uncertainty and optimal learning. Journal of
Monetary Economics 46, 199–228.
APPENDIX A
EQUILIBRIUM STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIP
The structure of the open economy (1)–(5) describes equilibrium relationships linking real
interest rates to the real exchange rate and output and inflation in each country. By adding
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Fisher equations and substituting out for the real exchange rate, we obtain an alternative
equilibrium structural relationship in the form of equation (A.1), where observations Yt of
output and inflation (yt πt y∗t π∗t )′ are a function of nominal interest rates Rt = (it i∗t )′,
shocks ξt = (et ut e∗t u∗t )′ and measurement errors ηt . Expectation terms drop out as they
are zero in i.i.d. equilibrium with no systematic biases in policy:
Yt = AtRt + Bξt + ηt . (A.1)
The elements of matrix At are nonlinear functions of the elasticities (b1t , b2, a1t , a2, a3)
in the aggregate supply and demand curves. At switches between A and A as the time-
varying elasticities switch between (b1, a1) and (b1, a1). The nonlinear functions in At are
given by equation (A.2):
At =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2
1 − a23
−a1t (a3 − 1) + a2a3
1 − a23
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
) −a1t (a3 − 1) − a2a3 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
−a1t (a3 − 1) + a2a3
1 − a23
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2
1 − a23
−a1t (a3 − 1) − a2a3 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
) a1t (a3 − 1) − a2 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (A.2)
The matrix B depends only on time-invariant elasticities (b2, a3) and is described by
equation (A.3):
B =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
1
1 − a23
a3
1 − a23
0 0
1
b2
(
1 − a23
) a3
b2
(
1 − a23
) b−12 0
a3
1 − a23
1
1 − a23
0 0
a3
b2
(
1 − a23
) 1
b2
(
1 − a23
) 0 b−12
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
. (A.3)
For the analysis with uncoordinated policies, it is useful to decompose the equilibrium
structural relationship further to separate the roles of home and foreign nominal interest
rates. This is done in equation (A.4):
Yt = A1t it + A2t i∗t + Bξt + ηt . (A.4)
Matrices A1t and A2t are defined in equation (A.5) and will switch between
(A1, A2) and (A1, A2) as the underlying time-varying elasticities switch between (b1, a1)
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and (b1, a1):
A1t =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2
1 − a23
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
−a1t (a3 − 1) + a2a3
1 − a23
−a1t (a3 − 1) − a2a3 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
A2t =
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−a1t (a3 − 1) + a2a3
1 − a23
−a1t (a3 − 1) − a2a3 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2
1 − a23
a1t (a3 − 1) − a2 − b1t
(
1 − a23
)
b2
(
1 − a23
)
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
(A.5)
APPENDIX B
NUMERICAL SOLUTION OF ACTIVE LEARNING POLICY
The numerical solution to the coordinated active learning policy is obtained by iterating
on the Bellman equation (17). This requires expressions for the expected one-period return
Et(Y
′
t Yt ) and continuation value EtVt+1 as functions of nominal interest rates Rt . The
expected one-period return and continuation value can be calculated from the equilibrium
structural relationship (6) and equation (B.1), respectively, where future beliefs µt+1 have
been substituted out using the central bank learning process (11):
EtVt+1 = EtV (B(µt , ξt , Rt , Yt ), ξt+1). (B.1)
The expectation in equation (B.1) is formed before observing output, inflation, and next
period shocks by evaluating the double integral in equation (B.2):
EtVt+1 =
∫ ∫
V (B(µt , ξt , Rt , Yt ), ξt+1)f (Yt |µt ,ξt ,Rt )f (ξt+1) dYt dξt+1. (B.2)
f (ξt+1) is the distribution of shocks ξt+1 and f (Yt |µt ,ξt ,Rt .) is the predicted distribution
of Yt . They have independent multivariate distributions, normal and a mixture of normals
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respectively, as described by equations (B.3) and (B.4):
f (ξt+1) = N
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎝
0
0
0
0
⎞
⎟⎟⎠ ;
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎝
σ 2e 0 0 0
0 σ 2u 0 0
0 0 σ 2e 0
0 0 0 σ 2u
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎦ , (B.3)
f (Yt |µt ,ξt ,Rt ) = µtN [ ARt + Bξt ;η] + (1 − µt)N [ARt + Bξt ;η]. (B.4)
The computational algorithm starts by defining a grid of points in the state space
(µt , ξt ).
18 The gridpoints for beliefs µt are distributed uniformly across the integral [0,
1], but gridpoints for the shocks ξt are bunched around zero according to a cosine weight-
ing function to increase accuracy. For each gridpoint, we take starting values for nominal
interest rates Rt and the value function Vt from those under the passive learning policy.
An iteration of the Bellman equation involves passing through the grid point by point. At
each gridpoint, the nominal interest rate choices are reoptimized by minimising the right-
hand side of the Bellman equation (17), using the equilibrium structural relationship (6) to
calculate the expected one-period return and equations (B.2)–(B.4) to calculate the expected
continuation value. Numerical evaluation of the expected continuation value requires linear
interpolation of adjacent gridpoints to solve the double integral in (B.2). The reoptimized
values of Rt and Vt are then assigned to the gridpoint. An iteration of the Bellman equation
is complete when the nominal interest rate choices and value function have been updated
for each gridpoint. Repeated application of the iterative procedure converges to the active
learning policy. We accept convergence when the values associated with each gridpoint
change by less than 0.0001 between successive iterations. When optimizing the nominal
interest rate choices at each gridpoint we use a convergence tolerance of 0.00001.
